MySQL Workbench
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CVE Vulnerabilities for MySQL Workbench

CVEPublishedSeverityDetailsExploitability Impact Vector
CVE‑2022‑12922022‑05‑03 16:15:19CRITICAL (10)The c_rehash script does not properly sanitise shell metacharacters to prevent command injection. This script is distributed by some operating systems in a manner where it is automatically executed. On such operating systems, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the script. Use of the c_rehash script is considered obsolete and should be replaced by the OpenSSL rehash command line tool. Fixed in OpenSSL 3.0.3 (Affected 3.0.0,3.0.1,3.0.2). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1o (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1n). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2ze (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2zd).46NETWORK
CVE‑2021‑445332022‑02‑24 19:15:09MEDIUM (5)Node.js < 12.22.9, < 14.18.3, < 16.13.2, and < 17.3.1 did not handle multi-value Relative Distinguished Names correctly. Attackers could craft certificate subjects containing a single-value Relative Distinguished Name that would be interpreted as a multi-value Relative Distinguished Name, for example, in order to inject a Common Name that would allow bypassing the certificate subject verification.Affected versions of Node.js that do not accept multi-value Relative Distinguished Names and are thus not vulnerable to such attacks themselves. However, third-party code that uses node's ambiguous presentation of certificate subjects may be vulnerable.41NETWORK
CVE‑2021‑445322022‑02‑24 19:15:09MEDIUM (5)Node.js < 12.22.9, < 14.18.3, < 16.13.2, and < 17.3.1 converts SANs (Subject Alternative Names) to a string format. It uses this string to check peer certificates against hostnames when validating connections. The string format was subject to an injection vulnerability when name constraints were used within a certificate chain, allowing the bypass of these name constraints.Versions of Node.js with the fix for this escape SANs containing the problematic characters in order to prevent the injection. This behavior can be reverted through the --security-revert command-line option.41NETWORK
CVE‑2021‑445312022‑02‑24 19:15:09HIGH (7)Accepting arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (SAN) types, unless a PKI is specifically defined to use a particular SAN type, can result in bypassing name-constrained intermediates. Node.js < 12.22.9, < 14.18.3, < 16.13.2, and < 17.3.1 was accepting URI SAN types, which PKIs are often not defined to use. Additionally, when a protocol allows URI SANs, Node.js did not match the URI correctly.Versions of Node.js with the fix for this disable the URI SAN type when checking a certificate against a hostname. This behavior can be reverted through the --security-revert command-line option.25NETWORK
CVE‑2021‑37122021‑08‑24 15:15:10HIGH (7)ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an ASN1_STRING structure which contains a buffer holding the string data and a field holding the buffer length. This contrasts with normal C strings which are repesented as a buffer for the string data which is terminated with a NUL (0) byte. Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed using OpenSSL's own "d2i" functions (and other similar parsing functions) as well as any string whose value has been set with the ASN1_STRING_set() function will additionally NUL terminate the byte array in the ASN1_STRING structure. However, it is possible for applications to directly construct valid ASN1_STRING structures which do not NUL terminate the byte array by directly setting the "data" and "length" fields in the ASN1_STRING array. This can also happen by using the ASN1_STRING_set0() function. Numerous OpenSSL functions that print ASN.1 data have been found to assume that the ASN1_STRING byte array will be NUL terminated, even though this is not guaranteed for strings that have been directly constructed. Where an application requests an ASN.1 structure to be printed, and where that ASN.1 structure contains ASN1_STRINGs that have been directly constructed by the application without NUL terminating the "data" field, then a read buffer overrun can occur. The same thing can also occur during name constraints processing of certificates (for example if a certificate has been directly constructed by the application instead of loading it via the OpenSSL parsing functions, and the certificate contains non NUL terminated ASN1_STRING structures). It can also occur in the X509_get1_email(), X509_REQ_get1_email() and X509_get1_ocsp() functions. If a malicious actor can cause an application to directly construct an ASN1_STRING and then process it through one of the affected OpenSSL functions then this issue could be hit. This might result in a crash (causing a Denial of Service attack). It could also result in the disclosure of private memory contents (such as private keys, or sensitive plaintext). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1l (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1k). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2za (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2y).25NETWORK
CVE‑2021‑34502021‑03‑25 15:15:14HIGH (7)The X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag enables additional security checks of the certificates present in a certificate chain. It is not set by default. Starting from OpenSSL version 1.1.1h a check to disallow certificates in the chain that have explicitly encoded elliptic curve parameters was added as an additional strict check. An error in the implementation of this check meant that the result of a previous check to confirm that certificates in the chain are valid CA certificates was overwritten. This effectively bypasses the check that non-CA certificates must not be able to issue other certificates. If a "purpose" has been configured then there is a subsequent opportunity for checks that the certificate is a valid CA. All of the named "purpose" values implemented in libcrypto perform this check. Therefore, where a purpose is set the certificate chain will still be rejected even when the strict flag has been used. A purpose is set by default in libssl client and server certificate verification routines, but it can be overridden or removed by an application. In order to be affected, an application must explicitly set the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT verification flag and either not set a purpose for the certificate verification or, in the case of TLS client or server applications, override the default purpose. OpenSSL versions 1.1.1h and newer are affected by this issue. Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1k. OpenSSL 1.0.2 is not impacted by this issue. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1k (Affected 1.1.1h-1.1.1j).25NETWORK
CVE‑2021‑34492021‑03‑25 15:15:13MEDIUM (6)An OpenSSL TLS server may crash if sent a maliciously crafted renegotiation ClientHello message from a client. If a TLSv1.2 renegotiation ClientHello omits the signature_algorithms extension (where it was present in the initial ClientHello), but includes a signature_algorithms_cert extension then a NULL pointer dereference will result, leading to a crash and a denial of service attack. A server is only vulnerable if it has TLSv1.2 and renegotiation enabled (which is the default configuration). OpenSSL TLS clients are not impacted by this issue. All OpenSSL 1.1.1 versions are affected by this issue. Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1k. OpenSSL 1.0.2 is not impacted by this issue. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1k (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1j).24NETWORK
CVE‑2020‑19672020‑04‑21 14:15:11HIGH (8)Server or client applications that call the SSL_check_chain() function during or after a TLS 1.3 handshake may crash due to a NULL pointer dereference as a result of incorrect handling of the "signature_algorithms_cert" TLS extension. The crash occurs if an invalid or unrecognised signature algorithm is received from the peer. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial of Service attack. OpenSSL version 1.1.1d, 1.1.1e, and 1.1.1f are affected by this issue. This issue did not affect OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.1d. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1g (Affected 1.1.1d-1.1.1f).44NETWORK
CVE‑2019‑15592019‑02‑27 23:29:00MEDIUM (6)If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one) then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data. In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in use. Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown() twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do anyway). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2r (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2q).24NETWORK
CVE‑2018‑25982018‑07‑18 13:29:00MEDIUM (4)Vulnerability in the MySQL Workbench component of Oracle MySQL (subcomponent: Workbench: Security: Encryption). Supported versions that are affected are 6.3.10 and earlier. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Workbench. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized read access to a subset of MySQL Workbench accessible data. CVSS 3.0 Base Score 3.7 (Confidentiality impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N).00NETWORK
CVE‑2017‑34692017‑04‑24 19:59:02MEDIUM (4)Vulnerability in the MySQL Workbench component of Oracle MySQL (subcomponent: Workbench: Security : Encryption). Supported versions that are affected are 6.3.8 and earlier. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Workbench. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized read access to a subset of MySQL Workbench accessible data. CVSS 3.0 Base Score 3.7 (Confidentiality impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N).00NETWORK

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A security tool by security auditors. From Passkeys and Argon2i to source validation and MVSP principles, Lavawall® has you covered.

Constant Improvement

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While Ninite and other patching tools have had the same patch offerings for decades, we're monitoring stats to keep adding the most useful programs (currently over 7,463)!

Details matter

From wrapping TLS communications in extra encryption and uninstalling remote support tools when they aren't used to detailed statistical analysis of system and network performance, Lavawall® goes in-depth.

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Lavawall® goes beyond patches and breach detection. We also monitor for risky Chromium extensions and allowed notifications that might be part of a phishing or ransomware attack.

Extended Cloud Security

Extend the security features of Cloudflare, Microsoft, Google, Sophos, and other cloud providers to create a Lavawall® of protection

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Even if you used breached remote management tools like ScreenConnect through Lavawall® when it was vulnerable, your computers stayed safe because we only install the agent when it needs to be used.

Integrations and automation

Easily deploy, monitor, and analyze security tools like Huntress, AutoElevate, and Sophos. Magically gain details from ZenDesk, ConnectWise, Datto, Panorama9, Microsoft, and Google.

Human and automated support

Get immediate fixes, user notifications, admin notifications -- and even security-certified human level 3 support when our advanced statistical analysis confirms a problem or anomaly.

We are constantly improving the Lavawall® tools to add more value. Some of our most recent changes include:
2024‑12‑020.12.19.206test commit
2024‑11‑220.12.18.205
2024‑10‑300.12.8.195Mac update refinements
2024‑10‑250.12.3.190
2024‑10‑210.12.0.187Macos implementaiton, linux and windows improvements
2024‑10‑160.11.128.186Linux stats and system information improvements, improvements for application shutdown
2024‑09‑120.11.113.171CPU Optimizations and Packages reliability improvements
2024‑09‑050.11.106.164Phased deployment enhancements
2024‑09‑040.11.103.161
2024‑09‑020.11.102.160CPU Optimizations and Packages reliability improvements
2024‑08‑300.11.99.157CPU Optimizations and Packages reliability improvements
2024‑08‑290.11.98.156CPU utilization and console event optimization
2024‑08‑280.11.97.155Reliability to detect unusual updates like redistributables.
2024‑08‑270.11.96.154
2024‑08‑260.11.95.153Faster response for reboot requests
2024‑08‑200.11.92.150Additional package upgrade pre-requisites
2024‑08‑150.11.89.147
2024‑08‑060.11.87.145
2024‑07‑260.11.83.141Add resiliency for MAC duplicates and uptime
2024‑07‑250.11.82.140Changes to facilitate cross-platform use. Bitlocker and Windows key refinements
2024‑07‑150.11.80.138Antivirus and temperature added to configuration checks
2024‑07‑150.11.79.137Add configuration checks for execution policy and secure boot
2024‑07‑110.11.77.135load balancing refinements
2024‑07‑100.11.76.134Add additional load balancing and data residency capabilities, add randomness to recurring task timings to decrease server load
2024‑07‑050.11.74.132changes to graph and residual work on user imporsonation
2024‑07‑040.11.73.131Add configuration checks for execution policy and secure boot.
2024‑07‑030.11.72.130Enhanced event log monitoring
2024‑07‑020.11.71.129Add details to Windows updates, enhanced risk metrics for application patches
2024‑06‑190.11.65.123Update resiliancy and garbage collection
2024‑06‑130.11.60.118Enhanced logging
2024‑06‑120.11.55.113Include the primary drive serial number; MAC addresses for built-in wireless, Bluetooth, and ethernet into the device hash to restore uninstalled and reinstalled devices in cases where the motherboard serial is not unique
2024‑06‑070.11.54.112Patch and package uninstall data addition
2024‑06‑050.11.47.105refine per-user registry application listing
2024‑06‑020.11.45.103uninstall and reinstall refinements, refine local logging, refine self-update and uninstall timing
2024‑05‑300.11.21.79various bug fixes and improvements
2024‑05‑280.11.16.74Error logging, registration, and uninstall improvements.
2024‑05‑240.11.14.72applied changes for devices and login commands, changes for registration as well
2024‑05‑220.11.13.71Add Windows computer model, improve Operating System parsing
2024‑05‑210.11.11.69Added additional states for Windows update, flexibility for non-standard program file configurations, support for network diagrams at the switch level, details for Windows editions
2024‑05‑210.11.10.68Add specific cases for Defender patterns and Composer versions.
2024‑05‑170.11.3.61Change Log storage location to c:\program files\Lavawall
2024‑05‑170.11.1.59self-update improvements.
2024‑05‑160.8.0.55 error log reporting and management.
2024‑05‑150.7.0.54Websocket resiliency improvements
2024‑05‑090.6.0.53 Error log reporting and management.
2024‑05‑010.5.44.52Even more improvements to scheduler
2024‑04‑240.5.41.49Install compatibility with Sandbox
2024‑04‑220.5.21.29Project property changes to enable automated compilation with new features.
2024‑04‑200.5.20.28Add motherboard serial number and company reassignment
2024‑04‑110.5.4.12Automate release notes as part of build process

Although the Linux agent code base is mature, dating back to 2006, we're still constantly improving it to add value and compatibility for new distributions. Some of our most recent changes include:
NOTE: changes after June 2024 are incorportated into the Windows Changelog as the codebases for Windows, Linux, and Mac were combined
2024‑05‑20253Added cleanup of old .json files during a re-install
2024‑05‑13252Added apt-get update to install
2024‑05‑06248Allow restart to use /var/run/reboot-required if needrestart is not installed
2024‑04‑22239Improve internal update and version tracking
2024‑04‑15235Add support for Yum packages
2024‑04‑08233Align patching with Windows patch reporting
2024‑04‑02228Add support for needrestart
2024‑03‑04224Schedule restarts
2024‑03‑25221Add support for apt packages
2024‑03‑18212Implement release management
2024‑03‑11202Add user login monitoring
2024‑03‑04189Enhance installation reliability
2024‑02‑26187Exapand triggers to identify if the instance needs to be restarted
2024‑02‑19146Improve compatibility for non-AWS instances
2024‑02‑14138Add self-uninstall capabilities
2024‑02‑12135Enhance scheduling flexibility
2024‑02‑07132Add kernel version tracking
2024‑02‑05124Add device hash to cryptographic self-update script validation
2024‑01‑29107Enhance encryption of patch data
2024‑01‑2298Improve how available storage is calculated
2024‑01‑1597Move initial tasks from installation file to sub scripts
2024‑05‑2191Improve multi-distribution compatibility
2024‑05‑2179Improve encryption reliability
2023‑12‑1168Enhance cryptographic validation of new scripts before updating
2023‑11‑2062Add inner layer of AES encryption in case TLS inspection doesn't allow for a secure connection
2023‑11‑2756Additional base cases for resiliancy
2023‑11‑2054Additional headers added to authentication process during installation.
2023‑11‑2053Enhanced key management
2023‑11‑1551Add insecure installation parameter to allow installation in environments with TLS inspection or other machine-in-the-middle situations.
2023‑11‑0642Enhance redundant encryption during installation.
2023‑10‑3033Improve install-over compatibility
2023‑10‑2318Add reboot configuration and scheduling
2023‑10‑2317Add self-updating functionality.
2023‑10‑1615Add Linux patching information for apt
2023‑10‑0914Collect system information
2023‑10‑0913Add Linux distribution information
2023‑09‑3012Add memory monitoring
2023‑09‑3010Add hardware information
2023‑09‑239Add AWS information
2023‑09‑238Add customized schedule capability for configuration updates
2023‑09‑237Add support for package monitoring using package and dpkg logs
2023‑09‑166Add storage data configuration gathering
2023‑09‑165Add CPU information

Lavawall®'s data gathering approach started with Government and Fortune 50 information security audits. When our founder transitioned from audit and assurance work to a Managed IT Service Provider (MSP), he was shocked that basics like Multi-Factor Authentication were painful to implement in some RMMs like ConnectWise and it was impossible to turn off remote access services in others like Datto RMM and SuperOps.

Lavawall® was built from the ground up with these concerns and the Minimum Viable Secure Product requirements in mind.

Some of the controls we implemented include:
  • PassKeys as the preferred primary authentication at no additional cost
  • Single Sign-on using modern, maintained, and industry-standard protocols for all customers at no additional cost
  • Multi-Factor Authentication as a non-negotiable default
  • Encrypting communications the same way as TLS again within the TLS tunnel, so we can allow TLS inspection without breaking like Huntress or disclosing security vulnerabilities to eavesdroppers.
  • Encouraging external vulnerability reports and customer testing
  • Passwords checked against popular disclosed passwords, hashed before they leave your computer, and then stored using Argon2id
  • Not requiring the use of passwords at all. We consider them a temporary backup authentication in case you can't use passkeys or SSO.

Lavawall® scanning computers are on dedicated servers in Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
Lavawall® databases and front-end systems are hosted with AWS in Montréal, Québec, Canada.
We send emails through AWS in Ireland and dedicated servers in Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
We send text messages for additional identity verification through Twilio in the United States.
We store executables and pass requests through Cloudflare at your nearest edge location.
We use Cloudflare for risk management, turnstile, and web application firewall services.
We use LeadPages for landing pages.
We use Google and Facebook for analytics on our public-facing pages, but they do not have access to the console.
We integrate with third-party tools, such as Microsoft, Google, Huntress, Screen Connect, Axcient, and Datto in their respective locations. However, you must initiate these integrations through single sign-on or by enabling them in your Lavawall® console.

Active security by design

Lavawall® is under active development with the latest release including:

7,463+

Monitored Applications

23+

System Metrics

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